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objective of protecting the United States.  
Department of Defense (DOD) practices, however, can serve as a model for 
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the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which restructured the military chain of command. This 
research explores how the DOD might offer solutions to DHS through lessons learned 
from 1973 through the early 1990s—some 20 years of hard-earned experience dealing 
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In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
created to protect the United States from the borders inward by consolidating the 
“confusing patchwork of government activities.”1 Therefore, any serious organizational 
or operational difficulties that DHS might face could severely affect U.S. security. In 
fact, persistent challenges regarding employee morale, leadership and management, 
education and training, and retention have plagued DHS, and the agency continues to 
struggle to resolve these issues. In light of what is at stake—the security of the United 
States—DHS leaders can look to other U.S. agencies, specifically to the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD), for alternative models and practices.   
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The U.S. armed forces did not start out with its personnel management and 
development policies and practices as currently seen. A series of challenges and 
developments—the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973 and the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986—necessitated the refinements that characterize the present system. How can 
the DOD’s example help DHS solve its personnel and management problems through 
lessons learned from the all-volunteer force and Goldwater-Nichols Act? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the DOD as a potential source of solutions to issues within 
DHS. In particular, the thesis will analyze the growing pains of DHS since its inception 
in 2003, which have fueled specific problems of leadership and management failures 
along with career development concerns regarding promotions and retention, and 
education, training, and advancement. These entrenched problems have resulted in DHS 
posting the lowest employee satisfaction ratings among all federal agencies.
2
 Such 
                                                          
1 Department of Homeland Security, Proposal to Create the Department of Homeland Security, 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, June 2002), 1. 
2 Kendall Breitman, “Federal Worker Job Satisfaction Hits a Low,” Politico, December 09, 2014, 
http://politico.com/story/2014/12/2014-federal-agency-rankings-job-satisfaction-low-113415.html. 
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workforce unhappiness eventually translates into lower cooperation, communication, 
innovation, and overall effectiveness of the department. 
The DOD, from 1973 through the early 1990s, worked to hone a system that 
focused on improving recruiting and retention, education and training, incentives for the 
service member and families, and overall unification of the total military force. 
Additionally, it has honed a system of building performance and leadership into the 
career trajectory of all its personnel. For example, it has formulated many developmental 
milestones for enlisted and officer personnel in each of its four branches. This career 
model, an aspect of what the armed forces calls “force development,” builds leadership 
and job-specific skills that foster the success of personnel throughout a career. 
Furthermore, the overall effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces should improve through 
each successive assignment because personnel advance in knowledge and expertise, 
which helps ensure a more capable and joint DOD.
3
 The DOD model can offer 
approaches that might be adapted to good effect in DHS. 
The analysis of the all-volunteer force and the Goldwater-Nichols Act should 
prove beneficial to DHS and propose ways in which the DOD can assist DHS in 
improving its force development issues to better the workforce and improve some of the 
significant concerns troubling DHS in its mission of protecting the United States.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to develop an understanding of the 
arguments with regard to the challenges DHS has faced since its inception. Then, it 
reviews and focuses on specific issues, including arguments for and against DHS’s ability 
to reform itself. It also focuses on whether DHS has been successful in its attempts to 
overcome a myriad of challenges seen through these issues that exacerbate the personnel 
management, education, and training, and morale issues. Next, management issues within 
                                                          
3 It is important to note that the DOD has not always had a career model such as the current system 
until the establishment of an all-volunteer force in 1973 and with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which 
increased the jointness of the DOD in 1986. 
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DHS are reviewed and analyzed to understand if DHS reform efforts have been 
successful.  
1. Growing Pains in DHS 
Before 9/11, the term “homeland security” did not exist in the United States.4 
With the terrorist attacks of 2001, however, the agency emerged to coordinate efforts to 
protect the U.S. homeland against terrorism. Five years later, the second edition of the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security focused on terrorist threats, but it added 
catastrophic events to include man-made and natural disasters.
5
 As of 2010, the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review lumped everything together, positing Homeland 
Security at an “intersection of evolving threats and hazards.”6 Still, DHS has struggled to 
define what homeland security means. As a result, according to Donald Kettl, it is 
difficult for DHS to understand the scope of its focus, which problems it could and 




Linda Klitz and James Ramsay propose that defining homeland security requires a 
multi-lens approach. A method that could be used “is to adapt and blend applicable 
theories from a number of academic disciplines that have relevance to homeland security 
issues and challenges.”8 These blended theories provide respective lenses of viewing 
homeland security through the fields of political science, criminal justice, public 
administration, sociology, and other fields. The overlap of each field, from the respective 
                                                          
4 Jerome H. Kahan, “What’s in a Name? The Meaning of Homeland Security,” Journal of Homeland 
Security Education 2, (2013), ,” Homeland Security Affairs 9, no. 10 (July 2013): 3, 
http://www.journalhse.org/v2jeromekahan.html.  
5 Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security,  October 2007), 9.  
6 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2010), 
viii.  
7 Donald F. Kettl, System under Stress: The Challenge to 21st Century Governance, (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: CQ Press, 2014), 69.  
8 Linda Klitz and James D. Ramsay, “Perceptual Framing of Homeland Security,” Homeland Security 
Affairs 8, no. 16, (August 2012): 3, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/230. 
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lenses, provides potential answers to helping better define homeland security, which 
could benefit the Department of Homeland security’s focus on its mission.9 
Alongside the lack of clarity about what homeland security means is the 
amalgamation of organizations that has affected DHS’s ability to conduct its mission 
properly. Homeland security as a mission, Donald Kettl explains, was not to replace old 
missions. Homeland security is a mission, which adds to the pre-existing missions of all 
the various agencies that would come under the umbrella of homeland security with DHS 
as the central authority.
10
 I.M. Destler and Ivo Daadler explain that the centralization of 
agencies for homeland security is not feasible, practical, or realistic.
11 
The basic reason is 
the “centralization alone cannot be the main answer to this formidable challenge.”12 By 
default, homeland security is a decentralized process through the efforts of federal, state, 
and local governments working toward the end goal of protecting the United States.
13 
 
On top of the homeland security mission, Jerome Kahan argues the dual nature of 
the DHS mission affects its ability to protect the United States. DHS is responsible for 
ensuring that the non-homeland security tasks happen, while at the same time, DHS must 




Christopher Bellavita points out that there is a gap between the national strategy 
and national strategy implementation.
15
 It would appear that this gap is an important, if 
not the most important, part of why DHS faced such significant struggles to organize 
itself for the mission of protecting the United States. If DHS cannot complete the mission 
                                                          
9 Klitz and Ramsay, “Perceptual Framing,” 5. 
10 Kettl, System Under Stress, 51. 
11 Ivo H. Daadler and I.M. Destler, “Advisors, Czars, and Councils: Organizing for Homeland 
Security,” The National Interest 68, (Summer 2002): 69, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/218399040?account
id=12702.  
12 Ibid., 66. 
13Ibid., 69. 
14 Kahan, “What’s in a Name? “ 6.   
15 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: Ten Essential Homeland Security Books,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 3, no. 1 (February 2013): 5, https://hsaj.org/articles/149. 
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it is tasked to perform—focusing on terrorism—the resulting actions, “congressional 
hearings, budgets, assessments, and documents” lead us to believe DHS has morphed into 
an organization focused on all potential hazards that face the United States.
16 
 
2. Whither DHS? 
Opinions regarding DHS seem to fall into one of two camps in relation to the 
usefulness of the organization. The first camp maintains that DHS is a successful 
organization that needs only to look for ways to accomplish its mission better, and the 
American people must have faith that DHS will work. What is there to lose? September 
11th happened under the previous plan to protect the United States and the federal 
government was not successful then, so maybe DHS will prove to have the answers to 
keep another attack from taking place.
17
  
Rick Nelson and Rob Wise champion the opinion that DHS has succeeded and is 
not a waste of an executive agency within the federal government.
18
 “The Department has 
wrestled with a variety of significant challenges: coordinating across twenty-two 
agencies, balancing a myriad of congressional committee requirements, and ensuring 
security and maintaining the privacy of the public.”19 The naysayers point to these three 
areas as reasons DHS has been unsuccessful, but the proponents say there has not been an 
attack since DHS’s inception therefore DHS is a success.20 
The second camp embraces the argument that DHS must disband. To put it more 
bluntly, DHS has proven to be “an unnecessary and costly reorganization of government. 
                                                          
16 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security,” 5.  
17 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 
1996). 158. 
18 Rick Nelson and Rob Wise, “Homeland Security at a Crossroads: Evolving DHS to Meet the Next 





DHS’s structure complicates management, frustrates oversight, and encourages wasteful 
spending. DHS grant programs also distort state and local spending priorities.”21  
Stephen Flynn argues that it is debatable “whether DHS was a philosophical 
mistake, there’s no question it has so far proven to be a bureaucratic failure” doomed 
from the start with lacking support from the Bush administration.
22
 Jeffrey Rosen 
concludes that DHS is hard to justify on the grounds of analysis of its costs and benefits. 
“DHS is one of the most expensive marketing ventures in political history,” and “the best 
argument for DHS is that the illusion of safety may itself provide tangible psychological 
and economic benefits.”23  
3. Management Problems in DHS 
If DHS were an answer to the U.S. strategy to defend itself from terrorism, 
Stephen Flynn would argue that DHS and the national strategy are missing the right 
focus, and that DHS and the national strategy do not fit together properly.
24 
He says, “The 
Department of Homeland Security is a confederation of twenty-two agencies that were 
hurriedly nailed, glued, and stitched together in the wake of 9/ 11.”25 Flynn argues that 
DHS was an improperly focused attempt to fulfill the national strategy to provide security 
for the country and to reassure the citizens in the wake of the events of September 11, 
2001, that the federal government was being proactive to protect the United States. 
Management weakness is still an issue within DHS, and it poses a risk to “mission 
accomplishment and efficient and effective use of the department’s resources.”26 One of 
                                                          
21 David Rittgers, “Abolish the Department of Homeland Security,” Policy Analysis, no. 683, 
(September, 2011): 21, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA683.pdf.  
22 Stephen E. Flynn, “Homeland Insecurity,” The American Interest 4, no. 5 (May 2009), 
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/05/01/homeland-insecurity/ 
23 Jeffrey Rosen, “Man-Made Disaster,” New Republic (December, 2008), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/man-made-disaster. 
24 Flynn, “Homeland Insecurity.” 
25 Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, 
and Warfare (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 25. 
26 Steven Bucci, Paul Rosenzweig, and David Inserra, Reforming DHS: Missed Opportunity Calls for 




the glaring issues of weak management is the findings that DHS suffers from low morale, 
particularly due to “lack of leadership, training, and performance-based rewards.”27 DHS 
has faced criticism for its personnel management policies. Daniel Gerstein states that 
DHS is making reforms that are beneficial to the organization. He does argue personnel 
management needs improving. to fix the problems relating to organizational structure, 
identity and culture, morale, and job satisfaction levels of employees.
28
 Gerstein argues 
the development of a Homeland Security personnel system and career maps would assist 




4. Organizational Structure and the Star Model 
The present study analyzes DHS’s hierarchical organizational structure to 
evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. In a hierarchy, theoretically, the manager at the top 
will possess control over all the agencies and departments and be able to effectively 
manage and lead the organization. The strengths of the hierarchical structure can be seen 
in a recent business article regarding a survey of employees. According to the article, 
those employees who understood hierarchical structures valued the clear cut lines of 
authority, managers of each level that are skilled to perform a specific job function, and a 
clear promotional path based on the structure because a hierarchy makes it is clear what 
the next step for advancement.
30 
 
As with any organizational structure, there are also weaknesses. Cameron 
Anderson and Courtney Brown argue that success of the hierarchical structure varies 
based on a few factors: what must be accomplished, who is the boss at the top of the 
                                                          
27 Bucci, Rosenzweig, and Inserra, “Reforming DHS,” 2. 
28 Assessing DHS’s Performance Watchdog Recommendations to Improve Homeland Security: 
Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight and Management 
Efficiency, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 3–5 (2015) (statement of Daniel Gerstein, The RAND 
Corporation). 
29 Ibid., 5. 
30 Christina DesMarais ,”Your Employees Like Hierarchy (No, Really),” Inc.com, accessed October 
28, 2015, http://star.inc.com/christina-desmarais/your-employees-like-hierarchy-no-really.html. 
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hierarchy, how power affects the boss, and whether the members of the organization feel 
able to be involved in the decisions and actions of the organization.
31 
  
Jay Galbraith and Edward Lawler point out some key reasons why organizations 
must be adaptive and willing to improve in today’s complex operating environment. 
These reasons are directly related to issues that will be analyzed through the Star Model. 
Galbraith and Lawler note that “how organizations are structured, how people are paid, 
how performance is measured, how individuals are trained and developed: increasingly, 
these are proving to be areas in which successful innovation can lead to improved 
performance.”32 
These very issues are important when exploring the organizational mentalities, 
and success and failures of DHS and DOD in order to work toward finding solutions for 
the personnel and management concerns. The Star Model provides the lens through 
which DHS and DOD can be compared and measured against one another.  
The Star Model, by Galbraith, highlights five key design points that require 
interconnectedness for an organization to function well: strategy, structure, processes, 
rewards, and people. Galbraith argues that within the fast-paced world of the 21st 
century, structure is becoming less and less important, and as a result, “there is no one-
size-fits-all organization design that all companies—regardless of their particular strategy 
needs—should subscribe to.”33 Structure is the drawing of the organizational lines and is 
important, but the focus on structure often becomes too much. Thus, process, rewards, 
and people are lost sight of within the organization, which significantly affects the 
performance of that organization. In today’s organizations, the design policies of process, 
                                                          
31 Cameron Anderson and Courtney E. Brown, “The Functions and Dysfunctions of Hierarchy,” 
University of California Berkeley, January 2010, 3, 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/251530804_The_Functions_and_Dysfunctions_of_Hierarchy. 
32 Jay R. Galbraith and Edward E. Lawler, III, “The Challenge of Change: Organizing for Competitive 
Advantage,” in Tomorrow’s Organization: Crafting Winning Capabilities in a Dynamic World, ed. Susan 
Albers Mohrman, Jay R. Galbraith, Edward E. Lawler, III, and Associates (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass, 2008), 1. 
33 Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Organizations; An Executive Guide to Strategy, Structure, and Process 
(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 14. 
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rewards, and people must be effectively managed and interconnected with strategy and 
structure in order to ensure organizational success.
34 
 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
DHS is not a perfect organization. Through analyzing the problems and issues, it 
has become more and more clear that the agency does face significant hurdles and 
challenges to ensuring the effective protection of the country. DHS must improve and 
continue to better its operational and organizational capabilities thereby tackling the force 
development issues faced since 2003.  
In some respects, DHS has made progress, but the strides are small, based on the 
importance of the overall mission and the wide reach of the organizations that make up 
DHS. Improvement will take time as DHS learns to operate more efficiently. DHS has 
become a jack-of-all-trades and a master of none, and prone to the mission creep that can 
so quickly engulf organizations with as many varying missions as DHS is responsible for. 
DHS has many organizations that are operating in a vertical fashion, but the organizations 
must improve their horizontal operations, interacting and sharing information between 
agencies.  
The DOD framework takes a myriad of jobs and organizations and unites them 
under one framework to give a common sight picture and required end state for each 
organization to be able to move forward to accomplish its mission. It is significant that 
the DOD is similar to DHS in the realm of scale, operational requirements, personnel 
numbers, and overall leadership and management challenges. If the DOD can overcome 
hurdles and challenges, particularly from the 1970s forward, there is hope that DHS can 
continue to develop into an effective and worthwhile organization held as competent and 
capable across the board by the federal government and American people.  
                                                          
34 Galbraith, Designing Organizations, 14. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines the pre-existing issues in which DHS has found itself 
struggling as the youngest and newest organization within the federal government. The 
foundation of these concerns stem from understanding how DHS was created, and the 
resulting conflicting mandates of mission responsibilities. The challenges faced by DHS 
since 2003 lead into analysis of the key issues of leadership and management of DHS and 
issues of morale, retention, training and equipment of organizations, which all come 
together to highlight severely lacking personnel management and leadership development 
programs within the Department. Inherent in the understanding of DHS’s issues, it is 
critical to have a baseline understanding of its organizational model. Secondly, the Star 
Model allows the analysis to compare DHS against the two DOD case studies to highlight 
where DHS can take past performance of DOD and potentially utilize these lessons 
learned to improve in the areas where it is weak. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins with an overview of relevant historical issues, which lead to the 
personnel management issues of DHS. In particular, the history highlights the lacking 
focus toward these key issues, but it also highlights the challenges of taking care of a 
personnel issues in a massive bureaucracy such as DHS. Next, this thesis analyzes DHS 
through utilizing the Star Model to show where DHS has succeeded and where the 
organization has fallen short in order to see where improvements can be made. This 
thesis is not to highlight DHS as a failure; on the contrary, there are successful policies 
and programs within DHS. The issue is the critical flaws within the personnel programs 
and policies affecting the entirety of the DHS workforce that are worth being examined.  
Finally, the DOD through the creation of the all-volunteer force and the passing of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act will be used as the two case studies from which potential 
solutions can be provided to help DHS fix itself. The two case studies are good examples 
because they highlight how DOD dealt with similar issues, which affected the personnel 
management and leadership development programs of the military between the 1970s and 
early 1990s.  
 11 
II. DHS’S CREATION AND RESULTING ISSUES 
The second-most disastrous attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor startled the 
United States, its citizens, and the security enterprise in ways not seen since December 
1941. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the defense and security of the United 
States emerged as a central responsibility of the federal government for which it was not 
adequately prepared.
35 
The attacks of 9/11, and the management, execution, and 
organization of its security structure changed dramatically in the weeks and months to 
follow jolted the federal government. An understanding of the historical foundation of 
DHS provides insight into the rationale for how and why this new department came to 
serve as the answer to protecting the country after 9/11—even amid the challenges that 
complicated DHS’s ability to perform this mission. 
An understanding of the historical foundation of DHS provides insight into the 
rationale for how and why this new department would serve as the answer to protecting 
the country post 9/11. With a new organization coming into being, there would be 
resulting challenges to complicate DHS’s ability to perform its mission. An 
understanding of the key challenges facing DHS from the beginning provides a better 
framework for how the personnel and management issues are still affecting the 
department years later. The haste with which DHS began to operate started the entire 
organization off on the wrong foot in regards to authority, budgeting, and personnel and 
management concerns.  
The massive organizational complexity of DHS led to a bureaucracy that is 
difficult to manage and oversee. Third, the merger of so many distinct agencies created a 
lack in jointness and unified culture that must be required of DHS. These three areas will 
bring to light how and why the personnel and management issues came to be within the 
department.  
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A. A SUDDEN START 
The smoke was settling and the recovery efforts still on going in both New York 
and Washington, D.C., and the federal government was on the hook to do something—
anything—to protect the United States better. The prevailing fear was that additional 
attacks were imminent, and the country wanted assurances—and action. The solution 
became DHS.  
The fundamental premise was that a singular department, ultimately responsible 
for the protection of the homeland, would keep information from slipping through the 
cracks. DHS would serve as the focal point to consolidate the “confusing patchwork of 
government activities” in order to maximize the abilities and effectiveness of the defense 
and intelligence agencies, as well as federal law enforcement and border protection.
36
 
It was clear, even before 9/11, that the security of the United States needed an 
overhaul, with its 40 agencies and 2,000 congressional committees mandating 
responsibilities for how best to provide for the defense and security of the nation.
37 
The 
Hart-Rudman Commission worked from 1998 to 2001 to analyze national security for the 
21st century. The Commission provided a written report and testimony to congressional 
committees to recommend how the United States could better organize its efforts. 
Specifically, the report recommended the development of a comprehensive national 
strategy to guard against and prepare for terrorist attacks, and the creation of a single 




In the spring of 2001, Republican Congressman Max Thornberry of Texas 
proposed a bill to combine agencies, specifically Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), Border Patrol, and others, under one agency, based on the Hart-
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Rudman Commission. As in the past, the reform efforts failed. Congressional hearings 
took place, but there was simply no support to reform the homeland security apparatus.
39 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 ultimately pushed the federal government 
into reforming the security bureaucracy—almost overnight. On September 22, 2001, 
President Bush declared the federal government would create an agency to protect the 
United States and its citizens from future terrorist attacks.
40 
Executive Order 13228 was 
issued on October 8, 2001, and created two unique agencies within the White House. 
First, the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) was an executive level agency for which 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was tapped to serve as the first director. OHS 
received the task to create and oversee the strategy that would unite the federal, state, and 
local effort to protect the United States from future threats.
41
 Second, the Homeland 
Security Council (HSC) formed a cabinet-level advising agency to the president 
regarding all matters related to homeland security—envisioned as an analog to the 
National Security Council.
42
 OHS gave Ridge a voice to advise the president on security 
matters. Ridge, however, “needed more authority and resources than were provided 
through the executive order.”43 Secretary Ridge was a proponent of the creation of DHS, 
and ultimately, so was Congress.  
President George W. Bush released a plan in June of 2002 that proposed the 
creation of a cabinet-level agency responsible for providing the organizational structure 
and oversight to unite the key agencies with a stake in protecting the country.
44
 DHS was 
approved through Public Law 107–296.45 DHS brought together the “Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and 
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several other agencies responsible for critical infrastructure protection.”46 Along with the 
proposal for the new department, the Bush administration created the Transportation 
Planning Office (TPO) to oversee and ensure a smooth transition of all the entities that 
would transfer under the authority and responsibility of DHS. In July 2002, the White 
House released the first National Strategy for Homeland Security through OHS.  
In the end, the attack of 9/11 served to break down the walls that divided how 
security was viewed and undertaken at the federal, state, or local government levels. The 
divisions of labor traditionally seen from the federal government all the way to the local 
levels were beginning to diminish. It became readily apparent that the line between 
“home and abroad” was not clear anymore, and the government, at all levels, needed to 
be involved and have a plan for how to deter threats to the country.
47
 DHS would serve as 
the mechanism through which this massive undertaking would take place. 
With the plan released and sent to Congress for approval, the TPO began to 
organize the anticipated implementation of DHS. “The Senate approved the Homeland 
Security Act on November 19, 2002, and the president signed it into law on November 
25, 2002.”48 Finally, DHS was open for business on January 24, 2003. On March 1, 2003, 
the majority of existing agencies transferred into DHS and began operating under the new 
hierarchy. Nine months after the announcement by the Bush Administration of the 
creation of DHS, all agencies being placed under DHS completed their transition. 
President Bush appointed Ridge to get the organization up and running, and DHS 
would be christened as the end-all-be-all for all things homeland security. In an 
interview, Ridge alluded to the fact that a business would have had at least a year to get 
its affairs in order once it received approval.
49
 DHS had less than 90 days from 
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authorization to get up and running. It is important to understand the scale and scope of 
the re-organization that Secretary Ridge and his team faced. DHS possessed a staff of 
more than 180,000 personnel, needed to create organizational policy, fill vacant 
positions, and create new positions, not to mention merging all the agencies under the 
authority of a new department.
50
 With all of these factors, DHS was woefully unprepared 
to take on the monumental tasks of its new mission.  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY: 
DHS attempted to combine, in full or in part, 22-plus federal organizations to 
protect the United States from terrorist attacks.
51
 This process still did not take into 
account the state and local homeland security agencies within all fifty states.
52
 
Ultimately, so many agencies were pulled into the new department that it was difficult to 
manage and organize all the entities effectively and efficiently. Additionally, all the 
organizations that came together were distinct and jealous of their particular missions in 
the security of the United States. Secretary Ridge stated in an interview, years after his 
tenure at DHS, “The second-most significant challenge was creating a collective sense of 
mission among the disparate entities that form DHS so that every agency appreciated the 
necessity of newfound internal collaboration among government agencies entities that 
had previously existed in silo’ed and closed-off entities.”53 
A major issues contributing to the lacking sense of mission was that DHS did not 
have an established policy shop until the tenure of Secretary Michael Chertoff. As a 
result, DHS required close interaction with the HSC to make decisions and get 
permission from the directors within the HSC in order to make decisions regarding DHS 
affairs.
54
 More importantly, it meant that Ridge did not have anyone outlining 
organizational policy to assist with establishing the operational climate for DHS. With 
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organizational policies lacking, this exacerbated and contributed to a disunity of the 
organization, and the eventual personnel and management issues within DHS.  
The desired organizational structure of DHS led to redundancies in the system. 
The DHS organizational structure was so broad, it was unable to know fully what branch, 
department, or individual was doing what task to accomplish the mission. For instance, 
the federal government offered, “100 federal terrorism response courses and created more 
than 100 federal terrorism response teams under the authority of five federal agencies and 
departments.”55 A terrorism response course is a needed and worthwhile endeavor in 
today’s world, but the unity of effort is not being effectively accomplished and utilized to 
its greatest potential based on the division of labor within DHS. As seen by this example, 
it is safe to assume the rest of DHS possessed similar redundancy issues, which waste 
work force efforts, money, and resources.  
The duplication of effort is ineffective in accomplishing the mission. More 
importantly, this highlights issues of employees unclear how their specific job fits into 
the bigger mission of DHS. As a result, employees are disgruntled and unhappy because 
they are not making a real difference in the mission. At the same time, the employees, 
because of the confusion about even the basic missions of DHS, are neglected, leaving a 
mismanaged workforce with low morale. 
C. JOINTNESS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY 
All the organizations that came together were unique, possessing their own 
cultural identity and framework with which they were accustomed to doing business. 
DHS faced the challenge of creating a culture and joint work environment amongst the 
collaboration of agencies in order to accomplish its goal of protecting the country. Each 
respective agency came into the arena of DHS with its own idea of how its mission fit the 
spectrum of providing security for the nation. Secretary Ridge had to figure out how, in 
his own words, to “integrate the capabilities of each component agency of DHS in a way 
                                                          
55 Wise and Nader, “Organizing the Federal System,” 45. 
 17 
that was both efficient in terms of the resources committed, while being effective in terms 
of the outcome desired.”56  
Before September 11, 2001, federally mandated training exercises showed federal 
and state agencies were not adequately prepared and able to work together for a terrorist 
event. Since the mid-1990s, preparedness for a terrorist attack had been a focus of the 
federal government.
57 
In 1998, President Bill Clinton issued PDD-62, which was intended 
to exercise and prepare federal, state, and local agencies to help prevent unconventional 
threats from endangering the homeland and Americans abroad.
58
 The federal government 
mandated exercises to focus on counterterrorism and consequence management exercises 
to evaluate the response capabilities of federal, state, and local response forces. As a 
result, “the exercises have revealed critically deficient capabilities, inadequate response 
plans, and serious intergovernmental conflicts that would likely emerge in a real 
situation.”59   
The federal training exercises highlight the status of the agencies responsible for 
homeland security prior to the events of 9/11, and as a result, the same manner of issues 
that would be seen after 9/11. These organizational issues would be inherited by DHS, 
and then DHS would be tasked with bringing these organizations into a close, systematic 
working relationship for which the protection of the United States hinges.  
The 9/11 Commission focused on the issues of jointness within the efforts of 
working to protect the homeland and providing solutions on how best to organize. Joint 
action is necessary by the DHS. If an agency cooperates with another, one agency has 
already worked to define the issue and therefore is willing to seek assistance in finding 
answers to the problem. Jointness brings together a multitude of individuals, with diverse 
backgrounds and capabilities, who can work as a team to better manage the issue and find 
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solutions to deal with or prevent the security risks and issues of the future.
60
 The bar was 
not high when the agencies were brought together under DHS, and there is much work to 
be accomplished to increase the capabilities and jointness of DHS. The assumption was 
DHS would be the ultimate answer to unify all the respective agencies in allowing for 
better protection of the homeland. The problem was that each agency brought over its 
respect issues into the purported melting pot of DHS, which initially served to exacerbate 
already known issues regarding the emergency management programs of the United 
States. 
In addition to the need for jointness, the cultural identity of the organization is a 
critical component that must be effectively managed in any organization. It is even more 
important when each of the twenty-two plus agencies brings its own unique and historic 
identity. The challenge provided to Secretary Ridge and his team was to change the 
organizational culture and unite the masses. Louis Gerstner, Jr., who was largely 
responsible for saving the IBM Corporation during his tenure as CEO, said, “I came to 
see, in my time at IBM, that culture isn’t just one aspect of the game—it is the game.”61 It 
only takes a little bit of experience in working in an agency to see that an individual’s 
respective agency is where an employee’s loyalty lies. “Every organization has its own 
unwritten rules…who makes the key decisions, how to dress, how best to spin a new idea 
to win approval” and the list can go on.62  
In order to bring DHS employees and agencies together, the identity must shift 
from each separate organization to that of one unified and focused team. Without the shift 
in cultural identity, the turf battles and allegiances to a respective organization are going 
to continue to cause disorder. In the end, it is about the DHS’s mission, not just Customs 
and Border Patrol or the Coast Guard’s mission. It is about the organization as a whole 
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maintaining the protection of the United States through making their specific missions 
adapt to the mission of DHS.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The hasty beginning, organizational complexity, and jointness and cultural issues 
all served to contribute to the personnel and management issues that would be seen in the 
future. One thing that exacerbated these very issues is that DHS did not have a policy 
shop until a few years after it began operations.
63
 The lack of established policy directly 
correlates to lacking guidance and policy for the entire organization because there is no 
entity with the authority or responsibility to write the policy that will direct and assist the 
spate of issues that result from merging 22 organizations. 
The inability of leaders in the organization to establish policy is a key issue. The 
personnel and management concerns within the organization relate to the lack of policy 
to highlight the focus and direction these two key areas should take. With the absence of 
a centralized policy shop within DHS for the first few years, policy shops were created in 
various agencies through DHS, which contributes to and further exacerbates the 
personnel issues.
64
 The policy shop sets the leadership foundation for the agency through 
outlining expectations and setting the tone for the how the organization will operate.  
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III. DHS’S STRUGGLES 
Organizational structure is affecting DHS’s ability to find itself capable in 
overcoming its personnel management challenges. With the creation of DHS, there was a 
large degree of “difficulty associated with ‘retrofitting’ basic organizational structure and 
capabilities.”65 DHS has struggled to overcome limitations to the merging of so many 
organizations, each with their own distinct organizational structure, into one capable and 
focused organization with a unified structure. As a result, DHS is mitigating the 
institution’s overall success.  
One way to examine—if not diagnose—a DHS organization is the Star Model. A 
business-sector approach with relevance for any organization or agency, the Star Model 
provides five key design policies—strategy, structure, processes, rewards, and people. 
The design policies of the Star Model help provide the foundation for understanding 
whether an organization is operating as effectively as possible through ensuring adequate 
focus and interconnection of each point of the model. From this analysis, DHS will be 
presented as both a successful and non-successful organization, with the unsuccessful 
aspects stemming from the personnel management struggles. In light of the gaps 
highlighted by the Star Model, it becomes clear that DHS has not adequately 
interconnected its design policies, particularly processes, people, and rewards, and this 
failure is hindering the personnel management programs of the organization. As a result, 
the persistent issues of employee morale, leadership and management, education and 
training, and retention continue to plague the organization and keep it from operating to 
its fullest capability. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
An organization’s structure is what provides the organization with form so that it 
can fulfill its mission within its operating environment. The bottom-line purpose of the 
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organization is being able to achieve its goals and missions. Organizational structure can 
best be understood as the construct of how employees and groups within the organization 
come together to perform tasks, responsibilities, and execute authority within the 
organization.
66
 As far as structure, there are firms that desire a centralized and rigid 
structure, while other companies might desire a more decentralized construct with less 
rigidity. Ultimately, the mission, organizational goals and requirements, personalities of 
the work force, and a host of other dynamics factor into the success or failure of the 
organization. While organizational structure varies from organization to organization, 
DHS utilizes the hierarchical structure of organizing its agencies to accomplish the 
mission.  
The hierarchical structure is one of the best-known organizational models because 
it is used throughout the DOD and the federal government. The hierarchical structure has 
both limitations and benefits, which are contributing to DHS’s problems. The hierarchical 
structure’s limitations manifest most clearly in the inability of the structure to create an 
“organization that can combine speed, cost effectiveness, product quality, and 
learning.”67 With the narrowing at the top, there is a reduction in capacity to be able to 
respond effectively and in a timely manner. The boss at the top simply has too many 
decisions that must be made, too little opportunity to give quality time and attention to 




To counter these limitations, the hierarchical structure does present benefits for an 
organization. Hierarchical organizations reach large numbers of people quickly, make 
clear the chain of command, organize agencies within the department and ultimately 
provide a rigid structure within which the department and its agencies operate. The 
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hierarchical structure lends itself to centralizing of DHS’s mission, but this may not be 
the best way in which to organize based on the example of Hurricane Katrina.  
Hurricane Katrina presents an example of when DHS’s hierarchical structure 
posed limitations to its mission. In particular, the inability of DHS to coordinate with 
various federal agencies—DOD, DOJ, and state- and local-level entities—suggests that 
the hierarchical structure is limited.
69 
DHS requested information of the DOD in the
initial days of Hurricane Katrina, but DOD expected the request to come from FEMA, 
which was a part of the newly formed DHS. As a result, time was wasted, confusion 
abounded, and unity of command was absent throughout the hierarchical structure, led to 
“excessive chains of authority which hinder communication, innovation, and 
flexibility.”70 DHS and DOJ clashed over responsibility in regards to who was the Senior
Federal Law Enforcement Officer (SFLEO) on the ground, due to clashing organizational 
responsibilities, competition between the two agencies, and lacking federal government 
policy of which organization was responsible as the SFLEO.
71
 These two examples are
only a few of the instances of lacking coordination and understanding of responsibility 
from DHS to other agencies that would assist in the disaster relief efforts. The bigger 
picture translates into concern over DHS’s ability to effectively govern its agencies and 
work with external agencies effectively through a hierarchical organizational construct.   
The hierarchical structure, while not the main focus, problem, or solution of this 
thesis, does present concerns for the ability of DHS to accomplish its mission. The 
benefits and concerns of the structure as presented and briefly highlighted with Hurricane 
Katrina can both serve to help and hinder DHS. In particular, it would seem that if the 
five policies of the Star Model are not being met and interconnected adequately, the 
hierarchical structure is a hindrance. On the other hand, if the organization can manage to 
69 Daniel P. Prieto, “The Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security: 
Goldwater-Nichols and Network-Centric Warfare,” paper presented at the Center for Strategic and 
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interconnect the five policies of the Star Model, the hierarchical structure lends its overall 
strengths and mitigates the weakness of the organizational construct.  
B. THE STAR MODEL 
The design policies of the Star Model by Jay Galbraith provide the answer to five 
key areas that an organization must adequately ensure are taken care of in order to 
succeed. As seen in Figure 1, five design policies crucial for any organization: 
Figure 1.  The Star Model 
Source: Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Organization: An Executive Guide to Strategy, 
Structure, and Process (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 10. 
Strategy is focused on developing the organizational goals and objectives that 
make up the mission.
72 
Structure is broken down into four areas: specialization, shape,
distribution of power, and departmentalization. Specialization is the “type and number of 
job specialties used in performing the work.”73 The number of personnel comprising
departments constitutes shape.
74 
Distribution of power is focused on the vertical axis of
the organization and on the important issues of centralization and decentralization. In the 
horizontal axis of the organization, the focus is on the power between each department 
72 Galbraith, Designing Organizations, 9. 
73 Ibid., 11. 
74 Ibid. 
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and priorities for the accomplishment of the mission between each department.
75 
Finally, 
departmentalization is the “basis for forming departments at each level of the structure.”76  
Structure is the drawing of the organizational lines, and is important, but the focus 
on structure often becomes too much. As a result, process, rewards, and people are lost 
sight of which significantly affects the performance of that organization. In today’s 
organizations, the design policies of process, rewards, and people must be effectively 




The processes of any organization are important. The vertical and horizontal axes 
through which communication take place in an organization are key, but instead of just 
being vertically focused, these processes have been shifting. In today’s complex 
operating environment, the lateral axis of the organization provides for better 
communication and more effective interaction within the entire organization. Today’s 
organizations must understand that “each department with information about—and a 
stake in—an issue contributes a representative for issue resolution.”78 It is important that 
information be able to flow fluidly between agencies within a department. Similarly, it is 
important that agencies do not become stove-piped and so focused on a specific task that 
the interconnectedness of all agencies involved in the process are minimized or ignored.  
The people focus of the Star Model is based on the human resource issues of the 
organization, and the quality of people that are within the organization. The rewards 
section of the star provides the incentives for the employees. The rewards must be tied to 
the structure and processes to ensure the accomplishment of the strategy and to motivate 
the people to want to achieve said strategy.
79 
It is critical to understand that if one area of 
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the star Model’s points is neglected or not functioning well, the entire organization and 
the other four points of the Model are affected.  
C. WHAT DOES THE STAR MODEL REVEAL ABOUT DHS? 
The oversight and management of the design policies within an organization, as 
outlined by the Star Model, are critical. Part of the concerns with DHS’s beginning 
revolve around so many varying practices of personnel management and leadership 
development being brought under one umbrella, such as “performance appraisal, 
compensation and rewards, training and development, and placement and career 
planning.”80 Failure to manage these types of issues adequately and effectively in relation 
to personnel management directly affects the employees, as is seen with the continual 
reports of low morale and dissatisfaction within DHS. As a result, DHS has struggled to 
overcome these challenges.  
The turbulent and hasty beginnings of DHS have contributed to the personnel 
management and leadership development problems within the Department of Homeland 
Security. The timetable for the creation of DHS did not allow ample time for the 
organizational strategy to be developed with the detail needed to ensure adequate 
personnel management programs. DHS was orchestrated through meetings that took 
place secretly and among a small group of senior leaders over the course of several weeks 
in the White House.
81 
With the limited scope of personnel who were a part of the 
planning process for developing DHS, it is fair to say that things were left off the table 
that should have been considered when orchestrating the interworking of a department of 
the magnitude of DHS. In particular, the understanding and realization of the massive 
undertaking that was DHS, in large part, seems to have been downplayed with a simple 
desire to get the department open and ready for business. 
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1. Strategy and Structure 
Possibly the first and most glaring strategic problem was that the initial strategy 
of DHS lacked a clear definition of what the term “homeland security,” its stated mission, 
meant. Before 9/11, the term “homeland security” did not exist in the United States.82 
With the terror attacks of 2001, however, DHS had to operate within the parameters of a 
lacking definitional understanding. The initial National Strategic Framework, in 2002, 
defined homeland security with terms of concerted national effort, reduced vulnerability, 
minimized damage, and prevention.
83 
At the same time, DHS included agencies that were 
not just focused on terrorism (the main focus for DHS at the beginning), but on 
transnational crime, immigration and customs, money laundering, protection of 
waterways, and drug smuggling, to name a few.
84 
It was clear from the beginning that 
DHS possessed gaps in its strategy. The organizations being absorbed lacked clarity on 
respective jobs to support the overall DHS mission, and DHS did not do a great job of 
clarifying how each agency fit into the overall mission of protecting the nation. In fact, 
there were some agencies, which came into DHS without a “mission statement related to 
their roles in the DHS, nor an acknowledgement of their subordination to DHS.”85 
The structure of DHS was predominantly predetermined by the plan orchestrated 
from the White House. The department’s leaders did not get a say because it was 
understood what specialization, shape, dimension of power, and departmentalization 
would make up DHS at the beginning. The lack of voice in relation to the structure and 
the combining of so many entities have strongly contributed to the issues with the 
department. The strategy and structure of DHS has also contributed to hindering the other 
three areas of the Star Model, which are critical to personnel management. 
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2. Processes, Rewards, and People 
The processes within DHS are hurting when it comes to the information and 
decisions being shared along the vertical and horizontal axis of the organization. The 
poor information sharing is not just affecting of the DHS mission, but it is also impacts 
the employees, exacerbating the divides between departments, increasing turf-battles, and 
hurting the ability of DHS to blend the cultures into one cohesive organization. DHS has 
many organizations that are operating in a vertical fashion, but the organizations must 
improve their horizontal operations, interacting and sharing information between 
agencies. If the information sharing between departments could be improved, this would 
drastically help to improve the integration and assist with blending the cultures of DHS 
and making a one-team, one-fight organization instead of individual organizations that 
just happen to be operating as a part of DHS.  
Even more importantly, DHS has found itself ranking low within the rankings of 
federal agencies in relation to morale and trust issues with senior DHS leaders, as well as 
the overall promotion, education, and employment system within DHS since 2003.
86 
There has been a high turnover of senior leader positions throughout the past fifteen years 
as well, and it is difficult to maintain the momentum of an organization while focusing on 
taking care of the organization and its people while dealing with consistent, high levels of 
turn over at the senior leader level. Additionally, it is important to note that senior leader 
vacancies with DHS have been a consistent factor as well. Between 2006 and 2010, 
according to a GAO report, these vacancies were due primarily to retirements and 
resignations.
87
 Still, vacancy rates across DHS, in 2006, 2007, and 2009 were higher 
statistically than other federal agency.
88
 
Management weakness is another issue challenging DHS, and it poses a risk to 
“mission accomplishment and efficient and effective use of the department’s 
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resources.”89 One of the glaring issues of weak management is the finding that DHS 
suffers from low morale, due to “lack of leadership, training, and performance-based 
rewards.”90 DHS has consistently faced criticism for its personnel management policies 
since its doors opened. Daniel Gerstein argues that DHS is making reforms that are 
beneficial to the organization, but he does go on to explain that personnel management 
needs improving. Specifically, improvement is needed to fix the problems relating to 
organizational structure, identity and culture, low morale, and job satisfaction levels of 
employees.  
DHS has been following a similar approach to the DOD in terms of professional 
development for its employees. DOD follows the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act implementation, which breaks down the civilian workforce into four 
levels of employment with the General Schedule (GS) pay grades. DHS four level model 
is called the Interagency National Security Professional (INSP) qualification.
91  
 
Level one, GS 1–9 is the awareness level where an employee has 
threshold/baseline knowledge, skills, and abilities. Level two, GS 9–12 is 
the basic and intermediate level where an employee has three to ten years’ 
experience for planning and interagency exposure via training and 
education. Level three, GS 12–15, is the advanced level where an 
employee has 20 years’ experience for strategic thinking and critical 
analysis to attain and maintain ‘INSP qualification. Level four, GS 14-
Senior Executive Service, is the executive level where an employee has 
20- to 30-plus years’ experience for DHS INSP Executive.92 
The focus and nature of DHS training and education revolve around the senior 
leaders and employees within the organization. There is little focus on the lower level 
employees who are performing the day-to-day mission within the level one and level two 
employee ranks.  
DHS is working to make improvements in relation to professional development. 
In particular, communication, training, diversity, and recognition are items highlighted 
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that tie into past concerns from federal employee surveys, but these surveys produced 
results that were similar to those of the most recent DHS employee survey in 2014. To 
attempt to answer these concerns, DHS established a DHS Leader Development Program 
to maximize “performance, strengthen the DHS leadership bench, and build leadership 
competencies at all levels of the DHS workforce, through a coherent and seamless 
continuum of leader development opportunities across the Department.”93 In 2011, DHS 
Deputy Secretary approved the Leadership Development Framework for all of DHS. The 
framework outlines the roadmap with which DHS intends to strengthen all levels of 
leadership within the organization through identifying five key leadership levels, which 
cover all of DHS.
94 
 
Lastly, DHS is attempting to build a more unified DHS through “Senior 
Executive Candidate Development Program,” “DHS Fellow Program,” “Diversity and 
Inclusion Strategic Plan,” and “Secretary’s Award Program,” all aimed at improving 
issues highlighted by the survey. In 2012, the first Senior Executive Candidate program 
began to prepare potential DHS employees for further leadership roles and growth within 
the department.  
In 2014, the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) released a Report to the 
Senate Chairman for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Of 
note is a table in the back of the report that highlights implementation status of leader 
development framework mentioned in the 2012 testimony. The leadership development 
framework is an attempt to gain training experience for DHS employees. The executive 
program started and offered one course, and the supervisor cornerstone implementation 
was mostly complete in fiscal year 2013. The manager, team leader, and team member 
programs have yet to reach implementation within the departments, but DHS scheduled 
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implementation for fiscal year 2015.
95 
The appearance is that while DHS is able to 
vocalize actions that should be taken, the implementation is ineffective and lacking at 
best. In order to best capture and maintain a resilient and ready workforce, of which 
morale is a huge key, DHS must begin to offer incentives and benefits to the lower level 
employees doing the homeland security mission on a day-to-day basis. 
The inability of establishing quality personnel management programs and 
leadership development policies that are effective in managing the department seems to 
be due to the power possessed by DHS. DHS has the ability to come up with ideas to fix 
the issues, but it is lacking in the power to be able to create, standardize, and implement a 
“federal homeland security professional workforce” which can “only come with sustained 
structure, management, and funding.”96 There must be an office or agency, which DHS 
gives the power to organize, create, and distribute the education, training, and 
professional development curriculum to all levels of the agency to help counter-balance 
the consistent woes of the personnel management workforce. The creation and 
implementation of a more robust and direct professional development program should 
help to overcome the personnel management and leadership development concerns, but it 
would also assist in helping to unite and create a more unified DHS. 
Stephanie Kostro, in two roundtable discussions with current and former DHS, 
industry, and think tank officials, provides some key issues and challenges DHS is facing. 
Even with current improvement efforts by the current secretary of DHS to unify the 
department, cultural resistance topped the list. The various agencies within the 
department do not seem willing to unify to work as a team, and instead, the various 
agencies in DHS hold allegiance to respective agencies regardless of falling under 
DHS.
97
 DHS still struggles to unite its agencies and employees under the unified mission. 
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As a result, it is directly understandable why DHS ranks low in federal employee surveys. 
While the desire for unification has been expressed, in reality there has been an inability 
to make a one team, one fight mentality since the organization was created, and this is 
continually exacerbated by not being able to unite the processes, rewards, and people to 
fit the strategy and structure of the Star Model in relation to DHS. 
D. CONCLUSION 
While DHS is striving to make improvements, the Star Model presents 
interconnectedness concerns in regards to DHS’s ability to put all five design policies of 
the Star Model together to operate efficiently. Each point of the Star Model is struggling, 
with the majority of the struggles coming from the processes, rewards, and people points 
of the model. The strategy for DHS is working in relation to the fact there has not been 
another major terrorist attack since 9/11. Also, the strategy is working because there have 
been numerous instances of DHS orchestrating with other agencies or in support of local 
and state agencies, which have led to the arrests of terrorist actors or groups.  
What is missing is a hard focus on the personnel management programs. With all 
the changes being implemented and worked on to make the personnel management issues 
better, DHS is still finding itself ranked low among agencies within the federal 
government in relation to chronic morale issues. The strategy is there for DHS to work to 
improve its personnel system, but it is not proving to be effective. The processes, 
rewards, and people area of the Star Model are lacking an impetus that pushes them 
toward improvement. Ultimately, the concern is that the personnel management issues of 
DHS will eventually wear down the ability of the agency to continue to function due to 
lack of communication, lack of personnel development training, high turnover of senior 
leaders, and an inability to find the strategy that can make all the points of the Star Model 
come together. 
With an understanding of DHS’s strengths and weakness in relation to personnel 
management, the DOD will be analyzed next to see how it worked through and, for all 
intents and purposes, succeeded in two major overhauls to its mission—the 
implementation of the All-Volunteer Force and the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols 
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Act. The Star Model will be utilized to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the 
DOD in relation to how it worked through these changes, and as a result, hopefully 
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IV. THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AND WHAT IT TEACHES DHS 
The transition of the DOD to an all-volunteer force highlights that 2001 is not the 
first time a large government entity has faced challenges within the realm of personnel 
management due to a major change in how an organization operates. As 9/11 was the 
impetus to the creation of DHS, the ambiguous conclusion to the unpopular conflict of 
the Vietnam War led to the creation of the all-volunteer force.  
The process highlights systematic steps by the government to ensure the right 
approach and plan was utilized to change the entire manner in which the DOD gathers its 
personnel. The use of commissions and studies all served to ensure a realistic 
understanding of the challenges that would come with the volunteer force transition.  
The DOD’s transition to an all-volunteer was not perfect, but it has been in place 
now for years, with the majority of Americans content with a non-conscription service. 
This chapter analyzes the advent of the all-volunteer force in terms of the Star Model. 
The strategy, structure, processes, rewards, and people will show the pros and cons of 
how the DOD transitioned, and the chapter concludes with some lessons that may 
resonate with DHS.  
A. THE STEPS TO THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
The change from the conscription military to an all-volunteer force could not 
effectively take place if rushed. From the president down to senior DOD leaders, the 
transition needed to be well thought out and eased into in order to maintain the 
effectiveness of the military branches without causing massive upheaval. The transition 
to the volunteer military was comparable to nothing the DOD and federal government 
had undertaken to date.  
President Richard Nixon made it clear during the campaigns and upon assuming 
office that the all-volunteer force needed to become a reality. As early as 1968, President 
Nixon made campaign promises that would speak to the desire of an all-volunteer 
military leading to the end of conscription. He stated, “I have looked into this question 
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carefully. And this is my belief: once our involvement in the Vietnam war is behind us, 
we [should] move toward an all-volunteer armed force.”98 The very thought of ending the 
draft appealed to the majority of Americans. Without a doubt, the promise to end the 
draft helped President Nixon to be elected, but more importantly, his election set the 
stage for a leader who favored draft reform and implementation of an all-volunteer 
force
.99 
President Nixon’s first step was to create the commission on an all-volunteer 
force, also known as the Gates Commission, after former Secretary of Defense Thomas 
Gates who chaired the commission. The commission took up its work in 1969 and the 
results were submitted in 1970. The commission drew the conclusion that the all-
volunteer force was capable of fulfilling the needs of the military services and thus 
capable of ensuring the safety and security of the nation. The commission noted four key 
areas that needed to be addressed—salaries, conditions of service and recruiting, and a 
standby draft system in event of war. The initial concern was that the all-volunteer force 
would not be able to provide adequate numbers of fighting men and women should 
another World War happen.  
The DOD also conducted its own study into the feasibility of ending conscription. 
Then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird implemented a study within the DOD called 
Project Volunteer Committee Report.
100 
Project Volunteer was more specifically focused 
on the “quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements” the DOD would face if 
conscription was ended.
101
 Of the more than 300 items in the report, all four services 
supported a few recommendations as essential to the successful transformation to an all-
volunteer force: 
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Adoption of a “salary system” for military pay, increased entry pay, use of 
enlistment bonuses for personnel with critically needed skills, increased 
educational benefits, including pre-service scholarships for officer 
programs, increased amounts and quality of bachelor and family housing, 
expanded entitlements for payment of dependent travel and transportation 




The incentives were related to pay and benefits of military personnel as an 
essential element for proper compensation of military personnel. The salary system refers 
to a revitalization of the military pay system to ensure a more focused and fair pay and 
compensation system for military employees. Additionally, the military services realized 
the need to provide bonuses as incentives for those that possessed critical skills that were 
marketable in the civilian workforce. The DOD needed to ensure that benefits and 
compensation were as equal as possible with the civilian market to attract and sustain 
personnel for the volunteer force. These very issues would all become matters of intense 
focus by the DOD with the ending of conscription in order to better recruit and retain 
members to serve in the volunteer force.  
The President’s Commission and Project Volunteer both had differing 
assessments of when conscription could be ended, but ultimately, the reports agreed on 
how to end conscription. The Gates Commission recommended an implementation date 
for all-volunteer force of July 1, 1971. The DOD and Secretary Laird felt more time was 
needed to ensure adequate plans were in place and ensure a smooth transition to a 
volunteer force. Everyone who had worked on the problem of the all-volunteer force with 
the DOD thought that, “the [Gates] commission had underestimated the difficulties of 
achieving a volunteer force.”103   
While the Gates commission ultimately recommended the all-volunteer force, the 
DOD understood that the process required more than a detailed and coherent plan to 
ensure a smooth transition. Ultimately, President Nixon accepted the reservations of the 
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DOD with the 1971 date of implementation, but the commission and report moved the 
country closer to ending the draft, which finally took place in 1973.
104
 
B. WHAT DOES THE STAR MODEL REVEAL ABOUT THE ALL-
VOLUNTEER FORCE IMPLEMENTATION? 
It was clear that the DOD needed to make changes to redefine how the American 
people viewed the military. “The transition to an all-volunteer force compelled the Army 
to reexamine many of its traditional policies and practices and fostered dramatic changes 
in the daily life, leadership philosophies, and training practices.”105 The re-examination of 
policies and practices held true for the other branches as well. The DOD had to find ways 
to make military life more appealing and the benefits worthwhile in order to attract 
recruits who were willing and able to serve and who would make up a quality workforce 
for the military. The DOD had to examine how to reconfigure daily life, leadership, 
education, training, recruitment and retention, and a myriad of other factors that could 
derail the plan, implementation, and future success of the all-volunteer force.  
1.   Strategy and Structure 
It was unclear at the beginning whether the all-volunteer force would be 
successful. Still, the DOD focused its efforts on ensuring that “the underlying principles 
were sound, implementation and sustainment appeared feasible, and sufficient 
management tools were available.”106 It was not until the second decade of the all-
volunteer force that the DOD came to see how it really needed to transform its personnel 
management programs and system in order to effectively take care of and provide for its 
workforce, which made the all-volunteer force more successful.
107 
The change in strategy 
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was key. When personnel are being drafted, personnel and management issues matter less 
because the force is going to be more easily maintained because of the ability to draft as 
many numbers as needed to fill the requirements of the military services. Once the draft 
was no longer in effect, all of the personnel and management functions mattered more as 
the incentives had to be in place in order to entice personnel to join the military service. 
The DOD had always possessed a strategy and structure to accomplish the mission, but it 
now had to connect more with an all-volunteer force through the principles of processes, 
rewards and people. During a conscription force, the DOD had not previously had to 
utilize the processes of recruiting, training, equipping, and rewarding personnel to 
incentivize people to stay in the military service. It was a paradigm shift in how the DOD 
thought about maintaining the force, the volunteer force, as opposed to the conscription 
force. 
When President Nixon began to study the feasibility of the all-volunteer force, he 
understood that the transition must be “handled cautiously and responsibly so that our 
national security” was maintained and ensured.108 The strategy began with the premise
that the transition should be carefully investigated and analyzed over time to ensure that 
the pros and cons of conscription versus the implementation of the all-volunteer force 
were adequately studied. The military was not just looking to change how the personnel 
would come--by force of conscription or volunteering--but even more importantly, how 
the social expectations of the military would be re-shaped. The country would be able, 
through the all-volunteer force, to see the military as another place of work, instead of 
just a place of forced labor waging war on behalf the nation.
109
The initial strategy and structure of changes to implement the all-volunteer force 
faced challenges. It was not for lack of preparation, but the unknowns of what was to 
transpire with a full-fledged volunteer force were ominous because it was unprecedented. 
In 1981, eight years removed from implementation, the DOD found itself on shaky 
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ground. “Inflation eroded pay and benefits. Inadequate defense budgets forced training 
cutbacks and delays in replacing obsolete equipment. Morale in the armed forces 
plummeted, and we began to lose many of our most experienced and talented people.”110
It was impossible to predict when these very issues might arise. The DOD had to work 
hard to overcome and tackle the challenges in order to ensure the all-volunteer force was 
ultimately successful.  
The military manpower policies had to change to encompass a few key 
differences post conscription that an all-volunteer force required. The issues were 
fourfold:  
(1) Recruit pay must be substantially higher than during the draft; (2) more 
compensation should be up front in the salary i.e., “visible,” rather than in 
kind or deferred, thereby allowing for a more efficient operation of the 
marketplace; (3)  military compensation should as much as possible be 
linked to skill differences of individual service members, again allowing 
for a more efficient marketplace; and (4) the career force should become a 
larger proportion of the enlisted force, the presumption being that this will 
reduce personnel turnover.
111
One immediate issue was how to increase salaries, benefits (medical, housing, and 
education), recruitment incentives for enlistees, and recruiting skills and initiatives for the 
recruiters for the sake of ensuring a wide range and breadth of volunteers to fill the 
quotas to maintain a functional and successful military force.
112
 For one thing, when
choosing careers or employers, individuals “are also interested in advancement 
opportunities or the speed of movement between jobs and levels of responsibility.”113 The
DOD had to figure out how to compete with the civilian sector and offer similar 
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incentives. The answer was the U.S. military moving toward a more occupational format 
of service for its personnel and the DOD working to ensure it could maintain end-
strength. 
2. Processes, Rewards, and People 
One of the initial reviews of the all-volunteer force was conducted six years after 
implementation to address some of the specific concerns the DOD was facing. Of those 
who participated in the survey, the military scored lower across the board than the 
civilian sector in the areas of competent supervisors, promotion chances, learning 
valuable skills, feedback, task significance, and others.
114 
The report showed that the 
DOD must train enlistees enough to induce them to “stay by being promoted more 
quickly and/or assigned to jobs with more favorable career paths.”115 The DOD struggled 
with finding the right balance for adequately and successfully providing for the 
workforce initially. The transition to a volunteer force was a slow process that took 
measuring and understanding what the all-volunteer force needed to survive and the 
desire to work through the issues as they arose. 
From 1973 to 1980, military personnel saw the GI Bill done away with, but there 
was an overall focus on increasing pay for first term enlistees and the recruiting services 
were given adequate resources, which was productive in keeping the first term 
enlistees.
116 
With the end of the Vietnam War, many officers and Non-Commissioned 
officers exited the military because of a growing cynicism with the Army, and the army 
and DOD as a whole saw “declining enlistment rates, low quality recruits, high attrition, 
and plummeting morale,” all serving as quality indicators that the DOD was struggling in 
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its all-volunteer force infancy.
117
  The first ten-year review of the all-volunteer force was 
pessimistic, at best, and even President Nixon felt that the all-volunteer force might be a 
failure, and that it might be worthwhile to return to a draftee force.
118 
 
The DOD initially faced reductions in recruiting quotas and in the initial quality 
of personnel who voluntarily jointed the military service. “Pay raises, combined with 
improved recruiting techniques and a poor civilian economy, rectified many of these 
problems by the early-to-mid-1980s.”119 The 20-year review showed that the all-volunteer 
force had been widely successful, and it has been successful because the all-volunteer 
force has been given the resources needed to recruit, train, and sustain the military force, 
as well as ensuring adequate attention is provided to the important matter of pay, training, 
and benefits, which are provided to service members.
120
  
The very effort of getting people to joining the military service falls into the laps 
of the recruiters who are responsible for selling the military to the men and women who 
are thinking about joining. The recruiters and the DOD needed tools at their disposal that 
would incentivize and assist in reaching recruitment goals for the DOD. It is key that the 
DOD did not make these changes to processes, people, and rewards overnight. It was into 
the second decade of the all-volunteer force before the effects of the incentives really 
began to be realized by the DOD workforce.
121 
The challenges were not easy for the 
DOD, and they highlighted an ever-increasing need for the DOD to be willing to adapt its 
methods and ideology to recruit, retain, train, and equip its workforce.  
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a. Recruitment and Retention 
The DOD began to realize in the late 1970s, that it was not meeting its recruiting 
goals when all four branches of service fell short.
122 
 The DOD found that it must not just 
focus on the incentives available to potential recruits, but that recruiting is directly tied to 
issues of retention through what is offered by the respective branch of service once a 
person enters military service.
123
 The recruiting process was important, but there was 
little reason for quality recruiting and recruits if the organization for which a recruit is 
about to enter is not the best.  
The transition to a volunteer force made recruitment and retention a priority. The 
concern from the Gates Commission and moving forward into the first decade of the all-
volunteer force was meeting each military branch’s end strength and being capable of 
protecting the country. During the era of conscription, DOD was able to retrain one in 
five of its personnel. By the late 1970s, the retention was one in three members served 
past an initial commitment. By the end of the first decade, the early 1980s, one in two 
military members reenlisted after the initial enlistment requirement.
124 
 
The result of the increased retention, thanks to benefits that increased educational 
incentives, bonuses, increases in salary, etc., allowed the military to boast a more 
experienced force than that which was seen during the era of conscription. Twenty-one 
years removed from the implementation of the all-volunteer force, the DOD could boast 
that 96 percent of its members possessed a high school diploma.
125 
The efforts of 
recruiters and recruiting initiative to find and gain quality members of society is reflected 
by this statistic, and this effort highlights the importance and success of the DOD’s 
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recruiting efforts to ensure a quality military workforce possessing the education skills 
that will benefit the respective branch of service and job a member will perform. 
b. Fair Treatment 
The fair treatment of personnel within the military is a crucial reason for the 
evolving effectiveness of the U.S. military. Good quality of life for a military family, 
compensation for long work hours and deployments, and benefits comparable with the 
civilian sector are huge morale boosters and ensure a workforce that wants to serve.
126 
The DOD hard to change its view that though personnel choose to serve in dangerous 
roles as military members, the services must be willing to provide a supportive  
environment. to support the military member and dependents.  
Compensation for service is crucial. It was clear in the studies after the 
implementation of the all-volunteer force, in order for members to be willing to enlist, 
compensation must be equivalent to that of the civilian sector. If the pay is not 
equivalent, the members of the armed forces are less likely to re-enlist.
127 
The issue of 
compensation directly correlates to matters of quality of life and providing for the 
military member and family that competes with the civilian sectors officers of equivalent 
skills. The 1980s brought a subsequent pay raise that significantly turned this trend 
around in 1981 and 1982.
128 
The result was direct policy changes that upped the 
compensation and improved the retention and morale issues being faced by the DOD. 
These changes managed to turn the trend around and work to equalize pay across the 
military and civilian sector.  
Related is the issue of promotions. The rates of promotion as a result of the 
restructuring were not widely affected. The fact of the matter was the implementation of 
voluntary separation and involuntary separation programs by the DOD assisted in 
managing and keeping the end strength numbers relatively close to where the numbers 
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As a result, it allowed the branches of service to ensure members 
were promoted as should be expected and provide a quality incentive to its members. 
Finally, the ability of military members to take care of families is crucial to 
morale and the ability of the military member to focus on a respective job. This 
correlation of intact families to the success of the volunteer force is a direct reflection of 
the equality of employment and promotions across the board, which, in turn, directly 
correlates to a professional force.
130 
It is crucial that the military be able to provide for a 
family, but it is also important to understand that the quality of life for a military member 
plays a factor in the family’s ability to stay intact, which is, in turn, a factor for military 
members retaining or exiting from the service.  
c. Uniting the Whole Force 
The key factor that seems to have most dramatically affected the overall health of 
the military and its ability to take care of its personnel stems from the workforce’s ability 
to trust in and have confidence in the federal government and DOD leadership to unite 
the entire force, active duty and reserve. The strengthening of the defense establishment 
had a direct effort on the total force especially when understood that “there was a 
continuing gap between the policy and the willingness and the ability of the active 
military leadership and Congress to implement it. Much of the inaction was due to the 
preoccupation...with the problems of creating and implementing the active AVF.”131 The 
1980s brought a renewed sense of trust to the DOD through increasing the amount of 
money put toward defense spending which would be put toward pay and benefits, 
compensation, recruiting, and training for the reserve force, which would directly 
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contribute to bring the reserve force up to levels equivalent with the active duty force, 
uniting the whole DOD.
132 
 
The active duty and reserve components were both equally revitalized in the 
1980s under President Ronald Regan. The trust was re-established with the president, 
congress, and senior DOD leaders placing more emphasis on providing adequate funding 
for resources ranging from recruitment and training to compensation and benefits.
133
 The 
all-volunteer force would be ultimately tested during the early 1990s with the Persian 
Gulf War.
134 
The test of the first Gulf War showed a military establishment that was 
integrated from the reserve to active duty components, and capable and well-trained 
through overcoming and working through the challenges of the past two decades to 
establish the all-volunteer force to be able to carry out the defense of the nation.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The strong focus of the federal government on the overall well-being of the DOD 
greatly assisted with improving the overall outlook and focus of the military’s ability to 
provide and maintain quality personnel management programs. These improvements 
related to key areas of pay and benefits, compensation packages, recruiting initiatives, 
improved training and education, and integration to the operational mission, as well as a 
key focus on integrating the reserve force with the active duty component. All of this was 
crucial in cementing the success of the all-volunteer force two decades removed from its 
creation.  
In contrast to the DOD experience, DHS is lacking in the ability to unite its entire 
workforce and agencies. There was a strong emphasis for support by the federal 
government to ensure DOD had the necessary funding, approval for necessary policy 
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changes, and overall understanding that the changes would take time, roughly twenty 
years for the all-volunteer force to take root and for it to be declared successful.
135
 
The inability of DHS to unite the whole force is hindering its ability to fully and 
effectively accomplish its mission. The workforce is suffering, especially at the lower 
levels, because DHS cannot unite itself. DHS is fragmented into various agencies that are 
clinging each to their own identity and culture. Each agency brought in its own personnel 
and management policies, training and requirements, hierarchy, promotion requirements 
for career advancement, etc. Until the lower level workforce feel the senior leaders, 
federal government and within DHS, are providing for them, DHS is going to struggle to 
be united and overcome its personnel and management weaknesses. The all-volunteer 
force example showcases success “because of the whole-hearted commitment of political 
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V. WHAT CAN DHS LEARN FROM THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT? 
The late 1970s to mid-1980s highlight the reasons the Goldwater-Nichols Act was 
required, and three specific military scenarios serve as an impetus to realizing reform was 
needed within the DOD. It is then important to study some of the specific issues that were 
hampering DOD’s integration and jointness, which led Congress to work to create the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Star Model provides an understanding as to how the military 
implemented the reform efforts and how the changes to the organization served to benefit 
the entirety of the DOD and increase the integration and operability of the DOD. 
A. WHY THE NEED FOR THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT? 
There were three military operations in the late 1970s and 1980s that highlighted 
the need for reform within the DOD.
137 
The Iranian hostage crisis occurred when the 
Shah of Iran lost influence with the Iranian people, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
came to power when the Shah left the country, eventually for the United States for 
medical treatment. The Iranian hostage rescue attempt resulted from Islamic 
revolutionaries storming and overtaking the United States Embassy in Tehran to demand 
the Shah’s return from the United States taking roughly 53 American citizens hostage.. 
Khomeini would not negotiate with President Jimmy Carter, and instead, the Ayatollah 
embarrassed the United States and Carter administration. Eventually, President Carter 
changed his decision, from the diplomatic attempts, to taking military action to attempt to 
free the hostages, and on April 24, 1980, the rescue attempt would fail to achieve its goal 
due to a helicopter and airplane colliding on the ground in the Iranian desert.  
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1. Hostages in Iran 
The Iranian hostage rescue attempt highlighted issues of the DOD in lacking a 
unified command structure, unclear roles of the military services, and ineffective 
communication flow between these services.
138
 The majority of the communication 
taking place during the planning stages for the mission was within the respective services, 
but there was minimal to no cross-talk between the four services for this massive joint 
operation. As a result, insufficient information was reaching the decision makers 
orchestrating the rescue mission.
139 
Because of the compartmentalization of the rescue 
attempt, the units involved trained separately. After the failure, a large part of the 
criticism was directed at the lack of “joint training and coordination; the lack of 
integrated intelligence for use by the joint force; overly complex, service-unique planning 
by each military service, and communication deficiencies.”140 The compartmentalization 
would ultimately cause the Iranian hostage rescue mission to not be successful. 
2. Marines in Lebanon 
The second concern was as a result of the DOD presence in Beirut, Lebanon as 
part of a multi-national peacekeeping effort. The United States Embassy was attacked in 
April of 1983, killing 63, 17 of whom were American citizens. The second attack was at 
the Marine headquarters building, which killed 241 military personnel in October of 
1983. Both attacks were carried about by Hezbollah-linked militants driving two vehicle 
bearing improvised explosive devices.
141
 The embassy attack in April of 1983 killed 63, 
17 of whom were American, and the Marine headquarters building attack in October of 
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1983 killed 241 military personnel.
142
 With the subsequent investigation into the tragedy, 
key issues again reflected the integration issues of the military services: 
ambiguous chain of command, lack of proper oversight by higher levels of 
command, lack of adequate intelligence support, reporting by military 
sources of incomplete or inaccurate information, the failure of civilian 
leadership to heed the advice of senior military leaders concerning the 
overall risks of the operation, and the inability of the military to anticipate 
and protect against such attacks
.143 
It turned out that there were six chains of command that controlled a U.S. Marine 
Corps amphibious unit on the ground. As a result, there was a widespread failure to 




3. The United States in Grenada 
The third military situation that highlighted issues was the U.S. invasion of 
Grenada in October 25, 1983, two days after the Marine headquarters bombing in Beirut. 
The purpose of the invasion was to rescue American students being held hostage and to 
work toward restoring the democratic government within Grenada. On the whole, the 
invasion of Grenada was a success. “The students were freed unharmed, the Bishop 
government was ousted, Cuban troops were removed, and democracy was restored.”145 
The military forces that comprised the invasion force did not have up-to-date 
maps, intelligence support was lacking, accidents and issues of fratricide took place, and 
this was mostly contributed to issues of failed communication.
146
 The inability to have 
the right leaders involved in planning directly led to problems of logistical support once 
                                                          
142 Lovelace, Unification of the United States Armed Forces, 5; Zenko, “When Reagan Cut and Run.” 
143 Ibid., 6; Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of 
Representatives, Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut, H.R. Rep No. 11, at 25–70 (1983). 
144 Nemfakos et al., Perfect Storm, 7. 
145 Lovelace, Unification of the United States Armed Forces, 6. 
146 Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury, the Battle for Grenada, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 
221–230, 333–342. 
 52 
the military forces were on the ground.
147
 “Army combat units found they couldn’t talk to 
Navy support ships offshore because their radios weren’t compatible. Navy bureaucrats 
objected to refueling Army helicopters...a Marine officer balked at flying Army Rangers 
into battle.”148
 
The operation in Grenada was ultimately a success, but it was yet another 
poorly executed mission. With Grenada falling on the heels of the Iranian hostage rescue 
attempt and the Beirut bombings, this would be the final straw for the parochialism of the 
military services which continued to lead to ugly messes that cost American service 
members their lives. As President Reagan was ramping up the Cold War, the weakness 
through these military failures was alarming. There was concerns that with the advent of 
the all-volunteer force over the past decades, that potentially the dire predictions were 
coming true. 
B. WHAT ISSUES LED TO THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT? 
The DOD was operating in a fragmented and compartmentalized fashion heading 
into the 1980s. General David Jones, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) stated in a Congressional hearing in February 1982 that the DOD had made 
improvements, but “only on the margins,” and the DOD needed to do more in order to be 
able to effectively defend the country and wage the battles of the twentieth century.
149
 
Most importantly, Jones stated he had come to understand that reform of an organization 
was not feasible from the inside, but the pressure must come from outside the DOD 
structure in order for the DOD to be willing to make necessary changes to how it 
operated.
150 
The CJCS had little to no power to make the changes from inside the DOD 
system, but it was a land mark statement by General Jones who was willing to admit the 
DOD needed assistance, and as result, the Congress was able to realize it needed to 
intervene and assist the DOD with its reform efforts. 
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All four branches of service, pre-Goldwater-Nichols, desired to operate as 
independently as possible. It seems logical that a branch of the military would desire to 
operate with autonomy. This autonomy ensures, for example, that the Air Force can focus 
on the mission given it by the DOD, but also adequately ensure control over resources 
and funding. An example of this taking place was the Gaither Commission, which 
proposed larger budgets for each branch of the military. In this event, the military 
branches would lose the ability to control their own operations. As a result, the military 
services were all against the proposal.
151
  
One of the inherent issues with the DOD organizational construct was figuring out 
the balance of control versus autonomy between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the individual branches of service. The desire is for 
the DOD to have strong centralized control over its branches of service, yet at the same 
time, to allow the branches to have sufficiently delegated adequate responsibility to carry 
out its assigned mission. The balance between centralization and decentralization makes 
this a delicate and tough balance to maintain for the DOD.
152
 
As a result of General Jones and others’ concerns for the DOD, the United States 
Senate Committee on Armed Services began a report in 1982 that would take three years 
to complete. The report was titled “Defense Organization: The Need for Change”; it is 
commonly referred to as the Locher report, and it formed the basis for the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. The Locher report outlined 16 fundamental issues for the DOD and how it 
operated. Among them, there are a few key points that relate to issues currently being 
faced by DHS.  
1. Limited Mission Integration at DOD’s Policymaking Level 
The structure of the DOD was hindering the integration of the military services 
and the jointness required in military operations. The DOD was broken down into three 
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organizational components: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organizations of 
the JCS, and the military services themselves.
153 
The structure directly affected the 
“integration of service capabilities along mission lines,” which directly contributed to the 
lack of integration between the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
154
 The 
JCS had too much power to control the respective branches of service, which caused a 
stove-piping effect and produced no desire to work jointly among the services. 
2. Imbalance between Service and Joint Interests   
The DOD and the military branches were operating out of the bounds of their 
respective authorities. “The overwhelming influence of the four services was judged to be 
completely out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal 
responsibilities.”155 In particular, a few problems were seen. The Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) was not able to integrate the military forces effectively in order to best 
accomplish the DOD’s mission. The JSC, which ultimately was responsible for each 
branch of service, was set up so that each branch of service could effectively override any 
CJCS decision.
156 
These were two critical issues because they highlighted the SECDEF’s 
and CJCS’s lack of power, but it also showed that the military branches were their own 
fiefdoms concerned with what was best for each respective branch of service instead of 
the bigger and broader DOD mission. 
3. Failure to Adequately Implement the Concept of Unified Command 
The Unified Command concept breaks down the world into geographical areas of 
responsibility for the DOD. The unified commands, under the plans created by President 
Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, should have had authority over all personnel and 
resources within the respective unified command. The unified commanders had limited 
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and weak authority to take action as needed.
157 
The invasion of Grenada presented an 
example. The Atlantic Command was responsible for planning the operation, Urgent 
Fury, to invade Grenada. The issue was that the command was mostly focused on naval 
forces at the time, but it possessed Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Force elements.
158  
The 
issue is that there was not sufficient unification within the command at any level. The 
forces had not “trained sufficiently together, established common doctrine and 
procedures, or made their communications equipment and other systems 
interoperable.”159 These failures are highlighted through not having one unified 
commander designated who could ultimately control and have authority of every detail 
required of both day-to-day and war operations involving all air, sea, and ground forces 
within the respective command.   
4. Lack of Clarity of Strategic Goals 
The DOD faced a weakness when it came to expressing its strategic goals to its 
military services. As a result, there was a gap between joining the strategic goals to the 
military services’ mission to better achieve the mission of the DOD. The ability to more 
effectively apply clear goals to the organization served to enhance the jointness and 
integration of the DOD.
160
 On his way out the door as the CJSC, General Jones 
specifically addressed issues of the DOD formulating strategic goals. The military 
services all hold to their own traditions, and as such the desire to take care of one 
service’s internal needs leads to neglecting the “changing requirements” of the present 
and future because it is simply easier to live in the past. Additionally, the day-to-day 
grind that is felt by the JCS makes the immediate the focus versus the strategic, and as a 
result, the JCS becomes a “total captive of the urgent.”161 
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5. Insufficient Mechanisms for Change and Inadequate Feedback 
DOD was stymied in its ability to productively confront change and provide 
quality feedback to the organization. In relation to change, the individual services 
possessed too much power and control over its own promotion and assignment system. 
As a result, the services were reluctant to change because there was no incentive to 
change. In relation to feedback, DOD lacked an ability to provide a worthwhile review of 
mistakes and issues seen in performance. This inability results in no lessons learned, and 
the potential is for the military services to repeat past mistakes.
162 
As Iran, Lebanon, and 
Grenada demonstrate, from one mission to the next, the DOD was repeating the same 
mistakes because of its inability to cohesively unite its force to work together. 
6. Failure to Clarify the Desired Division of Work 
DOD struggled to adequately delegate appropriate jobs and missions to its 
military services. One of the “basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational efficiency 
is to rationally divide the work among various structural components,” but for the DOD, 
“desired division of work has not been adequately clarified in many instances.”163 This 
failure to divide up the responsibilities throughout the DOD also resulted in a duplication 
of effort wasting manpower, time, money, and resources. Without a unified command 
structure within the DOD, the services were performing roles that were specifically 
assigned the JCS.
164
 Without the adequate power by the SECDEF, the CJCS, and the 
Unified Commands, the services contributed to an inefficient structure. Additionally, the 
staffs of the SECDEF, CJCS, and service secretaries were large and contributed to a span 
of control that left the senior leaders struggling to control, let alone manage, the 
individual services and ensure proper mission accomplishment.
165 
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7. Insufficient Power and Influence of the Secretary of Defense 
With the vastness of the DOD, the SECDEF lacked sufficient power to oversee 
and lead the respective military services. The “institutional forces” served to undermine 
the Secretary’s ability to lead, and the services were not willing to assist in the carrying 
out of the organizational mission for all involved because of internal interests.
166
 The 
placing of the SECDEF as the ultimate person in charge of the DOD was significant 
because it placed a unified leader in charge of the DOD, with an advisor, the CJSC, who 
was advised by the JCS. The operational chain of command directly linked to the unified 
commands and commanders so that the operational needs and mission could be 
adequately provided for and taken care of. In light of the military failures seen 




8.  Inconsistent and Contradictory Pattern of Congressional Oversight 
Congress played a critical role in the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act, but that is not to say that there was not improvements that need to take place within 
Congress oversight of the DOD. The Locher report highlighted five key reasons that 
ultimately point to unfocused committees that often times provide contradictory 




With the need for structural changes highlighted by the Locher report, Congress 
came down hard on the DOD to cause it to have to change. The DOD would have been 
hard pressed to find itself capable of reform without congressional intervention. 
Congressional intervention, in relation to the structural issues of the DOD is important to 
note, because Congress did not have to act. There was no outside pressure pushing 
Congress to intervene; however, so over a period of four years from 1982 to 1986, “the 
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Armed Services committees in both houses became familiar with the issue and ultimately 
passed what most would call a thoughtful, coherent reform legislation.”169  
The structural changes resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols Act serve to 
highlight that there must be points of innovation with organizations when challenges and 
problems are faced. The entire organization has to work together to bring about the 
integration and effectiveness required of an institution such as the DOD. If internal 
reform, as stated by General Jones, is not possible, then outside influence needs to be 
utilized to ensure worthwhile and productive measures can secure the success of the 
essential mission of protecting the homeland, which was a central driving force because 
of concern for United States to effectively utilize its armed services.
170
  
President Eisenhower stated in the 1950s, “separate service responsibilities and 
activities must always be only the branches, not the central trunk of the national security 
tree…unified effort is not only a prerequisite for successful command of military 
operations during wartime, today it is also a prerequisite for…defense program in 
peacetime.”171 The Goldwater-Nichols Act would “accelerate the unification of the U.S. 
armed forces by fundamentally altering the manner in which they were raised, trained, 
commanded, and employed.”172 
C. WHAT DOES THE STAR MODEL REVEAL ABOUT THE 
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT? 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act had eight specific intents when Congress passed it in 
1986 to restructure the DOD: 
(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian 
authority in the Department; (2) to improve the military advice provided to 
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; 
(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and 
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specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions 
assigned to those commands; (4) to ensure that the authority of the 
commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully 
commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the 
accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands; (5) to increase 
attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; (6) to 
provide for more efficient use of defense resources; (7) to improve joint 
officer management policies; and (8) otherwise to enhance the 
effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and 
administration of the Department of Defense.
173
 
Each of the eight key areas that were fundamental in changing the structure of the 
DOD stemmed from the issues highlighted by the Locher report.  
1. Strategy and Structure 
The strengthening of civilian authority was instrumental in ensuring a proper and 
effective strategy that originated from the leader of the DOD throughout the organization. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act set the SECDEF as the leader of the DOD, and as such, it 
ensured that there was a focal point for who would drive the DOD’s strategy.174 The 
SECDEF utilized the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), a classified document, which 
outlines the DOD’s strategies, challenges, opportunities, and focuses on the 
organizational needs over a pre-determined planning period.
175 
The DPG also serves as 
the measuring stick for evaluation of the military services and respective leaders of each 
branch of service. The SECDEF ensures that Unified Commander’s respective guidance 
is taken into account and implemented through the respective unified command, and that 
the entities, air, sea, or land forces, that serve within the unified command.
176
 
The strategy is further aided through having one principle military advisor to the 
SECDEF. Through having a CJCS who is the only voice that matters to the Secretary, the 
confusion and issues highlighted in the Locher pre-Goldwater-Nichols were 
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 With a unified voice and focal point for the DOD through the CJCS, it 
enabled the CJS to know that speaking out against issues within the DOD and concerns 
with strategy could be shared without fear of retribution or lack of unified voice.  
The structure of the operational chains of commands was disorganized and 
burdensome. The chain of command needed to emphasize who was in charge, in relation 
to respective day-to-day responsibilities and military endeavors around the globe as 
performed by the DOD. Specifically, the Commanders in Chief (CINC) of the combatant 
commands needed more authority, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act made the chain of 
command more clear: President to the SECDEF, to the CINCs. The Chairman of the JCS 
and the JCS were effectively removed from the decision-making processes. Additionally, 
the authority of the CINCs were improved through the ability to:  
direct subordinate commands in all aspects of military operations, joint 
training, and logistics; prescribe the chain of command to the commands 
and forces within the command; organize the command and forces within 
the command; employ forces within the command as he considers 
necessary to accomplish the command’s missions; assign command 
functions to subordinate commanders; coordinate and approve 
administrative, support, and disciplinary activities necessary to carry out 
missions assigned to the command; select and suspend subordinate 
commanders and staff officers; and convene courts martial.
178
 
These factors inherently took better care of the personnel performing the mission 
and provided appropriate processes for personnel and management issues within the 
DOD while also ensuring that the right personnel and leaders had the appropriate 
responsibilities to perform the mission. 
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2. People, Rewards, and People 
 The reform for the DOD would force the military services to be able to 
adequately figure out how to correct the processes of communication and operating in a 
strictly vertical fashion within their respective domains. When operating in a vertical 
fashion, and as seen through the three military operations examples, the DOD was 
ineffective in accomplishing its mission. The requirement and need for jointness requires 
communication along the horizontal axis of the organization and forces the organizations 
to work together to achieve the mission for the effective defense of the United States.
179 
The personnel system issues were mainly seen through the troubles to put quality officers 
into joint officer jobs. 
 There was stigma that was a placed on officers who desired to serve in joint 
officer billets within the DOD. Officers were not prepared academically or through career 
experience, and the services would actively monitor the allegiance of an officer in a joint 
assignment to their respective branch of service.
180 
The Goldwater-Nichols act placed 
requirements on the expectations for joint officers that made it more worthwhile to the 
career of officers, and at the same time, it assisted in the integration and jointness of the 
military services.
181 
The military services all maintained a requirement to ensure enough 
qualified officers were available to fill joint officer billets throughout the DOD. 
Operational effectiveness was greatly improved through the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act. With the military branches unified, the people were better taken care of to perform 
the mission, and as result, the military commanders dealing with directing and 
commanding military operations were more capably equipped with a unified force of 
personnel who were focused because of the improvements of joint training. One key part 
of improving operational effectiveness was focus by Congress on key issues impacting 
quality management by DOD leaders. Such issues as an unduly large spans of control, 
unnecessary staff layers, duplication of effort by the military services, poor supervision, 
                                                          
179 Jones, “Reform: The Beginnings,” 3. 
180 Locher, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” 14. 
181 Quinn, “ The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization,” xi; LoPresti, The JCS System Before and 
After, 44. 
 62 
and lacking guidance for division of work all revolved around managerial issues within 
the DOD. Additionally, the effectiveness improved through the creation of Joint 
Education for military members, joint doctrine, and joint training which helped unite and 
prepare personnel for the mission, and as a result, the Goldwater-Nichols Act made it 




The Goldwater-Nichols Act highlights the need for change when an organization 
is struggling to adapt to its mission and struggling to effectively overcome the challenges 
within the organizational structure. The DOD, through admission of its inability to 
effectively champion change in itself, looked and allowed Congress to come up with 
solutions that would be effective to create a more joint and cohesive operating structure 
to benefit the organization. As a result of the changes, the DOD effectively overcame 
challenges to its operation strategy and structure, but the personnel and management 
concerns where assisted and alleviated in large regard because of the effectiveness of the 
changes.  
This is not to say that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was universally accepted on day 
one. The Commandant of the Marine Corps thought chaos would ensue, and the Air 
Force Secretary warned the Goldwater-Nichols Act would have grave consequences for 
overall defense of the United States.
183
 More currently, retired Admiral Dennis Blair, 
who became Director of National Intelligence, stated, “it took decades to overcome the 
negative aspects of inter-service rivalry among the services.”184 Blair is honest in stating 
he thought the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a mistake, and the solution was something 
more obvious. He would later admit, “I was wrong. I was flat wrong. The armed forces 
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are much more effective working together today.”185 The DOD had to respond and 
address the issues outlined by Congress, and as a result, it forced the DOD to get behind 
the processes that made it achieve great success through needed structural reform. 
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This thesis has highlighted significant challenges that DHS has and is facing in 
relation to its personnel and management concerns. The good news is that DHS is not the 
only government entity to ever face such personnel and management issues which also 
relate to structural issues within the department, and there is hope for DHS to overcome 
these challenges. The issues, however, are not going to disappear overnight. DHS has 
worked the past 13 years to find the right formula for overcoming its weaknesses, but 
DHS is still falling short of finding adequate solutions for overcoming its problems.  
The study of the DOD highlights that personnel and management and structural 
issues are nothing new for an organization within the federal government. The DOD 
serves as a reminder of some of the potential solutions that can be put into place to help 
overcome the challenges without reinventing the wheel from the analysis of the all-
volunteer force and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. From a broader perspective, there are a 
couple of things that can happen to assist DHS. First, DHS must be willing to focus and 
tackle one issue at a time. Second, DHS needs outside assistance through better focused 
Congressional support and pressure to ensure it makes the changes.  
A. ONE REFORM EFFORT AT A TIME 
The DOD faced two significant challenges in the span of thirteen years that were 
overcome and weathered through reform. The status quo of previous years was done 
away with, and change was forced in an attempt to ensure that the DOD could function as 
effectively and efficiently as possible. First, the reform efforts came through taking care 
of personnel issues via the all-volunteer force, and second, through taking care of the 
structural issues via the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Based on the sequence of events, it is not 
apparent that the sequence was planned in order to make one change benefit from the 
other. It is clear that the personnel issues being rectified first assisted with having the 
people in place in order to manage the structural reforms that would come later. It would 
be monumentally challenging, if not impossible, to focus on reform efforts while tackling 
working toward changing the personnel system and the structure of an organization.  
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DHS is in a similar position as the 1980s DOD, working reform efforts that are 
both personnel and management issues and structural issues all in one. The issue within a 
DHS, as with any organization, took time to be noticed to fully realize the problems were 
indeed problems that needed to be addressed. DHS has worked over and over again to 
find ways to mitigate its personnel and management issues, yet as previously discussed, 
the morale is still severely low. DHS has worked to find ways to better educate and train 
its workforce, but continues to focus from the top down rather than the bottom up. There 
are questions through DHS’s short history on whether the department is structured 
appropriately to even carry out the homeland security mission. Still, DHS, like the DOD, 
must tackle its challenges of reform by focusing on one task at a time. The focus should 
be structural, or it should be personnel, but as it stands now, DHS is spinning its wheels 
trying to overcome both simultaneously. 
B. OUTSIDE SUPPORT NEEDED 
To add to the conundrum of solving its own problems, DHS has no authorizing 
statute within which it is to function and perform its mission.
186 
The 2002 Homeland 
Security Act did provide framework for DHS and how it should operate, at least in part, 
but it did not provide an overall authorization of the department. Without governing 
authorization, DHS is certainly going to continue to struggle as it strives to make itself 
better. DHS needs help to reform itself. It would seem intuitive, but if the reform efforts 
being undertaken by DHS are not having the desired effect (and at this point it is obvious 
that they are not), then the organization is just wasting its time and resources.  
With the all-volunteer force and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, outside actors, 
Congress and the President, served as the impetus for making significant changes to the 
DOD. The DOD was not looking to become an all-volunteer force nor was the DOD 
greatly concerned with its short comings in military operations leading up to the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act. The DOD, as stated by General Jones in his outgoing comments 
to Congress, was not capable of reforming itself from the inside out, and it needed help.  
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Congressional oversight of DHS is focused on everything that DHS does. Still, 
the efforts of Congress, while well-intentioned, are hindering and stifling DHS more than 
they are assisting as DHS is responsible for testifying before roughly eighty-six 
Congressional committees. The congressional oversight of DHS is not effectively 
focused to assist DHS, but the focus poses “extraordinary burdens on the Department” 
and “makes it far more difficult for the Congress to guide the Departments activities in a 
consistent and focused way” in order to assist DHS in carrying out the homeland security 
mission.
187 
Currently, Congress’s lack of focus is only exacerbating the issues within 
DHS, not to mention taking the focus of DHS’s senior leaders away from the mission.  
Congress could better assist DHS in its reform efforts through changing from an 
oversight role of so many committees, to streamlining the oversight to eliminate 
redundancies, at a minimum. More practical and worthwhile to the betterment of DHS 
would be an approach by Congress that forces DHS to make changes, such as with the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act which cemented the chain of command structure of who was in 
charge, which lead to increase jointness and interoperability amongst the military 
services, as well as increased education, training, and equipping the force to better 
perform to protect the United States from external threats. 
C. EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF THE WORKFORCE 
Education and training are crucial for any organization, but given the important 
mission of DHS to protect the United States, they are even more critical. As noted with 
the DOD, education and training were revamped to ensure a force that was qualified and 
capable to perform the missions of the respective services. Additionally, the Goldwater-
Nichols Act focused on the jointness of education and training to ensure adequate 
interoperability of the military services. The act, and subsequent focus, on joint training 
and education was key to transforming the military services to be able to break down the 
previous barriers to inter-service cooperation.  
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DHS has focused on working to improve education and training since its 
inception. There was an established DHS training plan from the beginning in 2004 that 
focused internally on the needs of DHS.
188 
Hurricane Katrina, and corresponding lessons 
learned, served as an impetus for a more focused attempt at ensuring an increasingly 
intergovernmental professional education plan.
189
 It was clearly understood that training 
and education of the workforce was critical. The focus was shifted from internal to both 
internal and external components of the homeland security mission to ensure it 
encompassed the necessary components to accomplish the homeland security mission.  
The Hurricane Katrina lessons learned report led to an executive order that would 
be responsible for professional development for the homeland security workforce.
190
 The 
National Security Professional Direction (NSPD) “proposed to encompass professional 
development fellowship opportunities, guidelines for career advancement and, most 
significantly, a plan for interagency and intergovernmental assignments.”191 The NSPD, 
established through an Executive Order of President Bush in 2007, had the right focus 
and right initiative for focusing the all-encompassing needs to train and educate a diverse 
workforce responsible for a myriad of tasks within distinct agencies. Two years after the 
implementation of the NSPD, and with the change in presidential administrations, the 
NSPD lost initiative and focus from the administration in 2009. 
It has been previously noted that DHS lacks a legislative mandate, so this means 
that all the good plans that DHS possess for education and training have little support in 
gaining traction. It is understandable that something without a mandate receives little 
focus, but this is not effective for the longer term success of the workforce. DHS must 
receive the support required to improve its training and education, and it must be able to 
have the horsepower behind the initiatives that would come through Congressional 
support and action. The reform efforts and much needed mandate for DHS to operate 
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would greatly assist in being able to propel the NSPD forward to better manage, train, 
and equip the DHS workforce for the very important mission of securing and protecting 
the United States. 
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